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Abstract
A supplier is known to be subject to opportunism when contracting secretly with downstream
competitors, particularly when downstream firms have “passive beliefs.” We stress that in many
situations, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist and passive beliefs appear less plau-
sible than “wary beliefs,” introduced by McAfee and Schwartz. We show that in a broad range
of situations, equilibria with wary beliefs exist and reflect opportunism. Last, we confirm the
insight, derived by O’Brien and Shaffer using a more ad-hoc equilibrium concept, that RPM
eliminates the scope for opportunism.
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1 Introduction
When an upstream firm (a manufacturer, say) supplies several downstream competitors (e.g.,
retailers), it has an interest to restrict its supply so as to maintain high prices and profits, which
it can then share with the downstream firms. However, when dealing with one downstream
competitor, the upstream firm has an incentive to “free-ride” on the other competitors. Hart
and Tirole (1990) (hereafter HT) have been the first to formally study such opportunism and
show that it may prevent the upstream firm from fully exerting its market power. This insight,
developed in a context where downstream firms compete à la Cournot, has since been confirmed
by O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) (hereafter OS) for the case of Bertrand competition and by McAfee
and Schwartz (1994) (hereafter MS) for alternative reactions to contract “renegotiations.”
Such opportunistic behavior can arise for several reasons. First, the lack of commitment
about future contracts may constitute a key factor. If the manufacturer contracts sequentially
with competing retailers, then it has indeed an incentive to free-ride on early signing retailers
when negotiating later deals. Second, secret negotiations may also undermine the manufacturer’s
commitment power. Indeed, even if the manufacturer contracts simultaneously with all its
retailers, when deciding whether to pay a franchise fee, say, each retailer may still worry that
its competitors receive secret deals (e.g., lower prices per unit).1
This opportunism can for example take the form of discounted sales.2 It also gives rise to
“hold-up” problems that are for example common in the franchise industry: once franchisees
have invested in relation-specific assets, launched a new product or more simply paid a high
franchise fee, the franchiser might be tempted either to force franchisees out of or to install new
outlets in profitable locations.3 The risk of opportunism of course reduces franchisees’ willingness
to join the franchise and prevents the franchisor from fully exerting its market power.
This inability to exert full market power gives in turn the upstream firm an incentive to
reduce downstream competition,4 e.g., by granting exclusive rights or by integrating one down-
stream competitor and refusing to deal with its rivals. OS have pointed out that Resale Price
Maintenance (RPM), whereby the retail price of a product is set by the manufacturer rather
1Martin et al. (2001) have experimented alternative contracting situations between an upstream supplier
and downstream competitors. They observe that the upstream player was able to maintain output close to the
monopoly level significantly less often when making secret offers to the downstream players.
2DeGraba (1996, p. 573) mentions for example that “resellers have filed complaints with the FCC that AT&T
will sell time at one rate to them and will then offer a lower rate to a competitor who commits to a larger block
of time.” OS (p. 306) also discuss some anecdotical evidence.
3MS provide examples of such evidence.
4Nondiscrimination rules can as well limit opportunism and thus help the upstream firm exploit its market
power. DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) stress that “most favored customer” clauses may play a similar role,
but MS point out that the supplier may still “renegotiate” and offer a lower price / higher fixed fee that will
only attract few retailers; such provisions however affect the upstream firm’s incentives — see Marx and Shaffer
(2002); alternatively, as in the AT&T example mentioned by DeGraba (1996), resellers can ask for a term-by-term
most-favored-customer clause to avoid personalized discounts.
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than by the retailer, also allows a manufacturer to eliminate such risk of opportunism; the idea
is that, through RPM, a manufacturer can squeeze retail margins (since it then controls both
retail and wholesale prices) and become the residual claimant on all retail sales.
We focus here on situations where an upstream supplier secretly contracts with several
downstream competitors. A key issue for the analysis of these situations is how downstream
firms react to “unexpected” (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) offers. Their willingness to accept such
offers depends in turn on their beliefs regarding the offers made to their rivals. Intuitively, there
is little scope for opportunism if the competitors are highly “cautious” about unexpected offers.
If for example all competitors assume that the supplier is “flooding the market” whenever it
proposes to supply below the monopoly price, they would respond negatively to such offers — and
the supplier may thus be able to sustain the monopoly price. If instead competitors are more
optimistic when receiving unexpected offers, they might be more receptive to “special deals”,
which in turn may exacerbate the supplier’s temptation to flood the market. HT have argued
that, in a Cournot-like context where first the upstream firm supplies given quantities at given
prices, and then downstream firms compete for consumers, market competition, it is natural to
assume that downstream competitors have “passive” or “market-by-market” beliefs, whereby
they expect the supplier to stick to the equilibrium contracts with their rivals even if it makes
them an out-of-equilibrium offer. The reason is that, in such a Cournot-like context, the quantity
actually sold to one downstream firm does not directly affect the profit that the supplier derives
from its contracts with the other firms. Therefore, there is arguably no reason to believe that a
deviation on one contract would trigger a deviation on other contracts. Passive beliefs are also
convenient in that they are usually easy to study, and they have been used as well by OS (in a
slightly different way, as we explain below) and by MS.5
We stress however below that the strategic “independence” between the contracts signed
with the different competitors disappears when downstream competition is more Bertrand-like
and/or when downstream firms find out which contracts were signed before actually competing
in the final market. In all these cases, the contract signed with one competitor directly affects the
profitability of the contracts signed with the other competitors. This has two implications. First,
we show that there may not exist any equilibrium with passive beliefs. The reason comes from
the fact that, because of contract interdependency, the gain from a multilateral deviation may
exceed the total gains of the unilateral deviations. Second, downstream firms should anticipate
that, if the supplier deviates with one of them, it has an incentive to change the contracts offered
to the others. Passive beliefs thus appear less plausible. We propose to consider instead the
notion of wary beliefs introduced by MS: when it receives an unexpected offer, a downstream
firm then anticipates that the supplier acts optimally with its rivals, given the offer just received.
We then provide two types of result. First, wary beliefs equilibria still exhibit some degree
of opportunism, preventing the upstream firm from fully exploiting its market power. Second,
5Horn and Wolinsky (1988) use a bilateral Nash-Bargaining approach that also relates somewhat to passive
beliefs.
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in a linear model wary beliefs equilibria exist even when passive beliefs equilibria fail to exist; in
addition, the upstream firm performs better than when downstream firms have passive beliefs,
particularly so when retailers compete in prices rather than in quantities. Third, we confirm
OS’ insight regarding RPM: focusing again on the linear model, when retailers compete in prices
there exists a wary beliefs equilibrium where, thanks to RPM, the upstream firm fully exploits
its market power.
2 Framework
The framework is a simplified version of the model proposed by OS. An upstream manufacturer
M sells a product to final consumers through two differentiated retailers R1 and R2. The manu-
facturer produces with constant marginal cost c, while each retailer Ri operates at zero cost and
faces a demand Di(p1, p2) that is differentiable, downward slopping in pi and decreases when
the two prices p1 and p2 increase uniformly.
To simplify exposition, we will assume that (i) demand is symmetric:6 Di (p1, p2) = D (pi, pj),
with7 ∂1D + ∂2D < 0 < ∂2D, and (ii) when the wholesale price is set at marginal cost,
price competition leads retailers to charge the same Bertrand price pB, characterized by pB =
argmaxp (p− c)D
¡
p, pB
¢
.
These assumptions imply that the inverse demand function is also symmetric: Pi (q1, q2) =
P (qi, qj) and differentiable. We will further assume that ∂1P < ∂2P < 0 and that, when the
wholesale price is set at marginal cost, quantity competition leads the retailers to sell the same
Cournot quantity qC , characterized by qC = argmaxq
¡
P
¡
q, qC
¢
− c
¢
q. Last we suppose that
individual revenue functions are concave: for any qi and qj such that P (qi, qj) > 0,
∂211P (qi, qj) qi + 2∂1P (qi, qj) < 0.
We model the interactions between the manufacturer and its retailers as a non-cooperative
game:
1. M makes retailers take-it-or-leave-it offers; each retailer only observes its own offer and
decides whether to accept it or not. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on two-part
tariffs, of the form ti (qi) = fi +wiqi, which we will denote by ti = (fi, wi).8
2. The retailers who have accepted a contract in the first stage compete on the final market.
6This assumption is made for exposition purposes. The analysis generalizes to asymmetric situations at the
cost of significantly heavier notation.
7We will denote by ∂if the partial derivative of f with respect to its ith argument: if f = f (x1, ..., xn) ,
∂if = ∂f/∂xi; similarly, ∂2ijf = ∂
2f/∂xi∂xj , and so forth.
8 In what follows, two-part tariffs are always part of a best response; an equilibrium in two-part tariffs is thus a
“true” equilibrium, even considering unrestricted sets of contracts; however, there may exist additional equilibria
in which two-part tariffs are not used.
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In the following sections, we analyze different situations with respect to the nature of down-
stream competition and the available information. We will consider both quantity and price
competition on the downstream market; in the first case, the retailers set simultaneously the
quantity they order and sell on the final market;9 in the second case, retailers set retail prices and
order quantities so as to satisfy demand. Following MS, we also consider two possible informa-
tion structures: the accepted contracts can either be observed by both retailers before competing
on the downstream market (interim observability game) or not (interim unobservability game).
3 Passive beliefs
Analyzing the equilibria of this game requires an assumption on how retailers revise their beliefs
about the offers made to rivals, when receiving an “unexpected” (i.e., out-of-equilibrium) offer.
We will suppose in this section that retailers do not revise their beliefs: that is, each retailer
keeps assuming that the manufacturer offers the equilibrium contract to the rival retailer, even
when receiving an out-of-equilibrium offer. This is the so-called “passive beliefs” or “market-
by-market conjectures” assumption used both by HT and by MS.10
3.1 Opportunism
Let us first determine the equilibrium with passive beliefs in a Cournot setting with interim
unobservability. With passive beliefs each retailer Ri anticipates that its rival receives the
equilibrium offer and thus puts the equilibrium quantity qej on the market. Therefore, in response
to a contract ti, Ri chooses a quantity
Qi(wi) = argmax
qi
¡
Pi
¡
qi, qej
¢
−wi
¢
qi − fi, (1)
and accepts the contract as long as the corresponding profit is not negative. The manufacturer
uses the franchise fees to extract all retail profits:
fi =
¡
P
¡
Qi(wi), qej
¢
−wi
¢
Qi(wi),
and thus sets wholesale prices so as to maximize:
max
w1,w2
(P (Q1(w1), qe2)− c)Q1(w1) + (P (Q2 (w2) , qe1)− c)Q2(w2). (2)
Each wholesale price wi affects this profit only through
³
Pi
³
Qi (.) , qej
´
− c
´
Qi (.), which by con-
struction is maximized for Qi (c). Therefore, in equilibrium, the manufacturer charges wholesale
9 In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the retailers directly set quantities. As in HT, we could
have assumed that the retailers order quantities first and then compete in prices.
10Here beliefs are conjectures on the part of the firm, following the receipt of an out-of-equilibrium offer, about
the offer being made to the rival. Although the term “conjectures” might seem more appropriate than beliefs
(which might seem to refer to the “type” of the rival firm), we use the terminology established by MS throughout
this paper.
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prices equal to the marginal cost; there thus exists a unique equilibrium, which coincides with
the standard Cournot equilibrium:
Proposition 1 In a quantity competition setting with interim unobservability, there exists a
unique equilibrium with passive beliefs. The manufacturer sets marginal transfer prices equal to
marginal cost
³
wei = wej = c
´
, which leads to Cournot quantities and profit.
This result, originally due to HT, is very intuitive. With passive beliefs each retailer Ri
anticipates that its rival will stick to the equilibrium quantity qej and is thus willing to pay up to
P
³
qi + qej
´
for any given quantity qi. Since M can monitor the retail choice of qi through the
wholesale price wi and recover any expected profit through the franchise fee fi, it will “choose”
qi so as to maximize
³
P
³
qi + qej
´
− c
´
qi, which is achieved for the Cournot best response to
qej . As in HT, the manufacturer is thus subject to opportunism and even non linear wholesale
contracts do not allow it to fully exploit its monopoly power.
3.2 Nonexistence problems
Passive beliefs are convenient and usually lead to tractable results. They are also close in
spirit to the “contract equilibria” introduced by Crémer and Riordan (1987) and used in a
Bertrand setting by OS. This concept focuses on pairwise deviations: M and Ri sign the best
contract, given the contract signed with Rj ; in contrast, a perfect equilibrium with passive beliefs
must also resist multilateral deviations, where the manufacturer simultaneously deviates with
both retailers. Hence, any passive beliefs equilibrium is a contract equilibrium, but a contract
equilibrium is not a passive beliefs equilibrium if it does not survive to multilateral deviations.
It is easy to check that multilateral deviations are not more relevant than unilateral deviations
in the above Cournot setting where retailers never observe each other’s contracts. The producer’s
profit is of the form:
(w1 − c) q1 + f1 + (w2 − c) q2 + f2, (3)
where fi and qi denote respectively the fee paid and the quantity actually sold by Ri. Since Ri
does not observe the offer tj made to its rival before accepting or rejecting its own offer, fi cannot
depend on tj . In addition, when retailers compete in a Cournot fashion and never observe each
other’s contracts, the actual quantity qi also depends only on the offer ti made to Ri, and not
on tj (it depends of course on Ri’s belief about tj, but not on the actual tj). Therefore, the
two contracts affect the profit expression (3) in a separable way: the first two terms of the
profit expression depend on t1 only, while the other two terms depend on t2 only. The impact
of a multilateral deviation is thus simply the sum of the impacts of each unilateral deviation,
implying that any contract equilibrium is also a perfect equilibrium with passive beliefs (that
is, the two concepts coincide here).
We stress below that multilateral deviations may matter and prevent the existence of an equi-
librium when retailers observe each other’s contracts before choosing their quantities (interim
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observability) and/or when retailers compete in prices à la Bertrand. The quantity eventu-
ally sold by one retailer then depends on the offer actually made to the other retailer, thereby
destroying the above-mentioned separability.11
Consider for example the case where retailers compete à la Bertrand and never observe each
other’s contracts. Then, the price charged by Ri still depends only on the offer made to that
retailer:
pi = P (wi) ≡ argmax
p
(p−wi)D
¡
p, pej
¢
, (4)
but the quantity qi eventually sold by Ri depends on both wholesale prices:
qi = Qi (w1, w2) ≡ Di (P (w1) , P (w2)) .
Therefore, the profit expression (3) is no longer separable in w1 and w2: each wholesale price
wi has an effect on the wholesale revenue (wj − c)Qj (w1, w2) generated by the other retailer
and the impact of a multilateral deviation thus no longer adds-up those of unilateral deviations.
Whenever this cross effect is sufficiently important, the manufacturer’s objective is not concave
and a multilateral deviation can be attractive even when unilateral deviations are not. The
following proposition shows that indeed, multilateral deviations destroy the unique candidate
equilibrium identified by OS when the two retailers are sufficiently good substitutes. Let
ε ≡ −
pB∂1D
¡
pB, pB
¢
D (pB, pB)
and εS ≡
pB∂2D
¡
pB, pB
¢
D (pB, pB)
denote the direct and cross elasticities of the demand, evaluated at the Bertrand equilibrium.
We have:
Proposition 2 In a price competition setting with interim unobservability:
(i) if the cross elasticity of substitution is small, namely, if εS < ε/2, there exists a unique
equilibrium with passive beliefs; the manufacturer sets marginal transfer prices equal to marginal
cost
³
wei = wej = c
´
, which leads to Bertrand prices and profit;
(ii) if the cross elasticity of substitution is large (εS > ε/2), there exists no perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with passive beliefs.
Proof. In the price competition setting, if there exists an equilibrium of the interim un-
observability game with passive beliefs, this equilibrium is identical to the contract equilibrium
characterized by OS. Hence the unique equilibrium involves differentiable wholesale tariffs, with
11MS already mentions that existence can be an issue in the interim observability case. McAfee and Schwartz
(1995) explore this issue in more detail — they also emphasize that even a pairwise-proof equilibrium may fail to
exist when the number of competitors increases, since the candidate equilibrium would generate losses.
Segal and Whinston (2003) note a similar existence problem when the manufacturer faces non-constant returns
to scale. There again, the quantity sold to one retailer affects the profit achieved with the other retailer and
multilateral deviations become an issue.
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marginal wholesale prices equal to the manufacturer’s marginal cost, c and retail prices equal
to pB.12
Consider now a “double-sided deviation” based on wholesale prices (w1, w2); under passive
beliefs, Ri is willing to pay up to
fi = (P (wi)−wi)D
¡
P (wi) , pB
¢
,
where P (w) = argmax
p
πR (p,w) ≡ (p−w)D
¡
p, pB
¢
. The manufacturer’s profit is:
πP (w1, w2) ≡
©
(w1 − c)D (P (w1) , P (w2)) + (P (w1)−w1)D
¡
P (w1) , pB
¢
+(w2 − c)D (P (w2) , P (w1)) + (P (w2)−w2)D
¡
P (w2) , pB
¢ª
A bilateral deviation of the form w1 = w2 = c + ε is profitable whenever ∂211πP (c, c) +
∂212πP (c, c) > 0. From the above expression,
∂212πP (c, c) = 2∂2D
¡
pB, pB
¢
P 0 (c) .
To compute ∂211πP (c, c), note that
πP (w, c) = πR (P (w) , c) + constant.
Therefore,
∂1πP (w, c) = ∂1πR (P (w) , c)P 0 (w) ,
and thus (using P (c) = pB, ∂1πR (P (c) , c) = 0 and P 0 (c) = −
∂212πR
¡
pB, c
¢
∂211πR (pB, c)
)
∂211πP (c, c) = ∂211πR
¡
pB, c
¢ £
P 0 (c)
¤2
= −∂212πR
¡
pB, c
¢
P 0 (c) = ∂1D
¡
pB, pB
¢
P 0 (c) .
A bilateral deviation of the form w1 = w2 = c+ ε is thus profitable when
∂211πP (c, c) + ∂212πP (c, c) =
£
∂1D
¡
pB, pB
¢
+ 2∂2D
¡
pB, pB
¢¤
P 0 (c) > 0,
that is (since P 0 (c) > 0), when
εS
ε
=
∂2D
¡
pB, pB
¢
−∂1D (pB, pB)
> 1
2
.
When instead this condition is not satisfied, it is easy to check that the profit function πP (w1, w2)
is concave and that OS’ contract equilibrium thus constitutes a true perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Thus, no equilibrium exists in the Bertrand-like framework with interim unobservability
when the elasticity of substitution is higher than half of the direct elasticity at the Bertrand
12OS show that these are the only contract equilibria, without any prior restriction on the contracts. All
equilibria lead to the same retail prices and quantities, and one of them involves two-part tariffs of the form
Ti (qi) = πBi + cqi.
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equilibrium prices.13 A similar observation applies when retailers observe each other’s contracts
before choosing their prices or quantities. The quantity qi sold by Ri then depends again on the
actual offers made to the two retailers, and multilateral deviations may be profitable even when
unilateral deviations are not. Suppose for example that demand is linear and given by:
P (q1, q2) = 1− q1 − βq2.
The parameter β reflects the degree of substitution between the two retailers: β = 0 corresponds
to local monopolies, and β = 1 to perfect substitution. When retailers compete à la Bertrand
and never observe each other’s contracts, from the above proposition there is no equilibrium
when β > 12 ; when retailers observe each other’s contracts (whether they compete in a Bertrand
or Cournot fashion), there is similarly no equilibrium when β > bβ ≈ 0.806.14,15
4 Wary beliefs
Passive or “market-by-market” beliefs are plausible in the above Cournot context since, from the
point of view of the upstream monopolist, the two retailers then form two separate markets (even
though retailers themselves perceive a strong interdependency). The producer has no incentive
to change the offer to one retailer when altering the contract signed with the rival retailer: what
matters is the retailer’s anticipation about the quantity bought by its rival, not the quantity
actually bought.
As already noted, this independence disappears when retailers either compete in a Bertrand
fashion or observe rivals’ contracts before ordering their own quantities. In these situations, the
contract signed with one retailer affects the supplier’s sales to the other retailers. Recognizing
this point, MS suggested that retailers’ beliefs should be consistent with the producer’s incen-
tives. We will show that, when demand is linear, opting for consistent beliefs also helps restoring
the existence of an equilibrium.16
13With n downstream competitors, the nonexistence condition becomes (εS/ε > 1/2 (n− 1)); it thus becomes
more likely to be satisfied as the number of competitors increases. For example, in the linear demand highlighted
below, if the inverse demand function is given by Pi (q) = 1 − qi − βΣj 6=iqj , the equilibrium fails to exist when
β > 1/n.
14A proof this statement is presented in the Web appendix to this paper, available at
http://www.idei.asso.fr/English/ECv/CvChercheurs/EcvRey.html.
15Caprice (2002) considers the case where contracts remain unobserved but retailers observe each other’s ac-
ceptance decisions. This observability of acceptance decisions does not raise existence problems, but alters the
equilibrium contracts when retailers have access to an alternative source of supply (a competitive but less effi-
cient fringe, say); the manufacturer has then an incentive to lower the marginal wholesale price when acceptance
decisions are observed: this makes one retailer “more aggressive” when the other refuses the contract, and thus
reduces retailers’ rents.
16There may also exist equilibria with other types of beliefs. For example, “symmetric conjectures”, in which
each retailer believes that the producer always treat both retailers in the same way (even out of the equilibrium),
generates an equilibrium with monopoly prices (hence the producer can fully exploits its monopoly power under
this particular type of belief). We show in this paper that monopoly prices cannot be sustained with wary beliefs.
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Note that retailers must form beliefs not only about the contract offered to their rivals, but
also about the quantities or prices charged by their rivals (which in turn depend on rivals’s
beliefs). With passive beliefs, this issue is moot: since Ri believes that Rj received the equi-
librium contract, it must believe that Rj anticipates that its rival also received the equilibrium
contract and will thus sell the equilibrium quantity (in the Cournot-like setting) or charge the
equilibrium price (in the Bertrand-like framework). Ri thus chooses the best response to the
equilibrium quantity qej or price pej , given the contract offered to itself. However, if Ri believes
that the producer also offered an unexpected offer to Rj, Ri is likely to anticipate a change in
Rj ’s behavior. It is natural to assume that Ri will then expect Rj to optimally react to the
producer’s unexpected offer. MS thus proposed the following notion of wary beliefs:
Definition 1 Wary beliefs
When Ri receives a contract ti, it believes that:
1. the manufacturer expects it to accept this contract,
2. the manufacturer offers Rj (j 6= i) the contract Tj (ti) that is the best for the monopolist,
among all contracts acceptable to Rj,
3. Rj reasons the same way.
4.1 Quantity competition with interim unobservability
We first note that wary beliefs coincide with passive beliefs when retailers compete in quantities
and contracts are never observable. When being offered a contract ti = (fi, wi), Ri expects M
to offer Rj a contract Tj (ti) = (Fj (ti) ,Wj (ti)) and Rj to accept it. Ri then chooses a quantity,
Qi (ti), that constitutes the best reply to Rj’s anticipated quantity; Q1 (t1) and Q2 (t2) therefore
satisfy the recursive condition:
Qi(ti) = argmax
qi
(P (qi,Qj (Tj (ti)))−wi)qi.
In addition, Ri will accept a contract (wi, fi) if and only if the franchise fee fi is lower than the
retail expected profit, that is
fi ≤ (P (Qi(ti), Qj (Tj (ti)))−wi)Qi(ti).
It remains to determine the retailers’ beliefs Tj (ti). With wary beliefs, when Ri is offered a
tariff ti it anticipates that M offers and Rj accepts a tariff Tj (ti) given by:
Tj (ti) = argmax
(wj ,fj)
(wi − c)Qi (ti) + fi + (wj − c)Qj (tj) + fj
s.t. : fj ≤ (P (Qj(tj), Qi (Ti (tj)))−wj)Qj(tj)
Segal and Whinston (2003) point out that allowing the producer to offer menus of contracts and choose quantities
once retailers have accepted or rejected the offer reduces somewhat the set of possible equilibria for any belief, and
that all equilibrium outcomes must converge towards the competitive one when a strict competitive equilibrium
exists (that is, when the marginal cost of production is strictly increasing).
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The solution to this program does not depend on ti. Therefore, Ri’s conjectures are independent
of the contract it received and thus Tj (ti) = t∗j , the equilibrium offer. In this Cournot framework
with interim unobservability, wary beliefs are thus equivalent to passive beliefs:17
Proposition 3 In the quantity competition setting with interim unobservability, wary beliefs are
equivalent to passive beliefs; there thus exists a unique equilibrium with wary beliefs characterized
by
wC,Ui = w
C,U
j = c and q
C,U
i = q
C,U
j = q
C .
This equivalence is the underlying reason behind the plausibility of passive beliefs already
noted by HT for the Cournot setting with interim unobservability. We now show that this
equivalence breaks down when contracts are interim observable or when firms compete in a
Bertrand setting.
Remark. Although we use MS definition of wary beliefs, our transposition differs from theirs,
which relies on the retail equilibrium that would be generated by wholesale prices (w1, w2) if
these prices were common knowledge. More precisely, letting π (wi, wj) and q (wi, wj) denote
firm i’s profit and input demand when both firms know that the wholesale prices are wi and wj,
MS characterize wary beliefs as follows:
Wj (wi) = argmax
wj
[(wi − c)q(wi,Wj(wi)) + (wj − c)q(wj ,Wi(wj)) + π (wj,Wi (wj))] ,
Fj (wi) = π (Wj (wi) ,Wi (Wj (wi))) .
However, q(wi,Wj(wi)) is the quantity that Ri would sell if it was common knowledge that
Ri faces wi and Rj faces Wj (wi), which is incompatible with Rj selling q(wj,Wi(wj)). Using
instead the behavioral functions Qi (ti) allows us to avoid this inconsistency.18
4.2 Price competition with interim unobservability
Let us now consider the case where retailers compete in prices and never observe each other’s
contracts. When being offered a contract ti = (fi, wi), Ri expects M to offer Rj a contract
Tj (ti) = (Wj (ti) , Fj (ti)) and Rj to accept it. Then, Ri’s price must constitute its best reply to
its rival’s anticipated price:
Pi(ti) = argmax
pi
(pi −wi)D(pi, Pj(Tj(ti))).
17Throughout the paper, superscripts C and B will respectively refer to Cournot and Bertrand downstream
competition, while M refers to the monopoly outcome. Superscipts U and O refer respectively to the cases of
interim unobservabilty and interim observability.
18With MS formulation, in the case of interim unobservability the manufacturer’s profit is separable in wi and
wj , whatever the type of retail competition. With our formulation, in the case of Bertrand competition the
producer’s profit is no longer separable even with interim unobservability and wary beliefs thus differ from passive
beliefs.
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In addition, Ri accepts a contract (fi, wi) if and only if the franchise fee fi is lower than the
retail expected profit, that is
fi ≤ (Pi(ti)−wi)D(Pi(ti), Pj(Tj(ti))).
Conversely, when Ri is offered ti, with wary beliefs it anticipates that M offers and Rj accepts
the wholesale contract Tj (ti) given by:
Tj (ti) = argmax
(wj ,fj)
(wi − c)D(Pi(ti), Pj(tj)) + fi + (wj − c)D(Pj(tj), Pi(ti)) + fj. (5)
s.t. : fj ≤ (Pj(tj)−wj)D(Pj(tj), Pi(Ti(tj)))
In contrast with the case of Cournot competition, we cannot directly rule out anymore that
beliefs depend also on franchise fees — in which case the participation constraint is not guaranteed
to be binding. This potential dependence is however rather artificial, since it comes from the fact
that Ri’s beliefs Tj (ti) affect its price response Pi (ti), which in turn affects the determination
of Tj (.); thus, while franchise-dependent beliefs could self-sustain themselves, such dependence
is not triggered by fundamental variables. We therefore restrict our attention on beliefs that do
not depend on franchise fees, for which (5) boils down to:
Wj (wi) = argmax
wj
[(wi − c)D(Pi(wi), Pj(wj)) + (wj − c)D(Pj(wj), Pi(wi))
+(Pj(wj)−wj)D(Pj(wj), Pi(Wi(wj)))]
and Fj (wi) = (Pj(wj)−wj)D(Pj(wj), Pi(Wi(wj)))|wj=Wj(wi)
(6)
A more important difference with the case of Cournot competition is that the objective function
in (6) is no longer separable in wi and wj . This implies that wary beliefs now depend on wi and
thus differ from passive beliefs.
The following proposition provides some characterization of wary beliefs equilibria. We first
consider symmetric equilibria and show that the monopoly outcome cannot be sustained. We
then show that, when demand is linear, there exists indeed a (symmetric) wary equilibrium,
where each belief Wi is a polynomial function of wj.
Proposition 4 When contracts are interim unobservable and retailers compete à la Bertrand,
wary beliefs do not coincide with passive beliefs. If retailers have wary beliefs that only depend
on wholesale prices, then:
(i) In any symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium retail price is lower than the monopoly
price;
(ii) if demand is linear, there exists a unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs, and this
equilibrium is symmetric.
Proof. See Appendix A.
12
Therefore, in contrast to the case of passive beliefs, there exists an equilibrium with wary
beliefs when demand is linear. Retailers being now more “suspicious” about the manufacturer’s
behavior, out-of-equilibrium offers are more likely to be rejected, which ensures the existence
of an equilibrium. In the set of polynomial beliefs, this equilibrium is unique (beliefs are then
affine functions of wholesale prices) and symmetric. However, if wary beliefs reduce the scope
for opportunism, they do not completely eliminate this problem and the manufacturer cannot
maintain monopoly prices. The opportunism problem is thus “robust”, in the sense that it does
not critically depend on a particular choice of equilibrium concept (contract equilibrium, passive
or wary beliefs equilibria, and Cournot or Bertrand retail competition).
4.3 Interim observability
Finally, we assume in this section that contracts are interim observable: contract offers are
initially secret (acceptance decisions are therefore based on beliefs) but retailers observe the
accepted contracts before competing (in prices or in quantities) on the final market. The equi-
librium of the retail competition subgame is therefore the solution of a standard Cournot or
Bertrand-fashion competition game for which the firms face costs equal to wi and wj. In what
follows, we denote by qR (wi, wj) and πR(wi, wj), the retail quantity and profit emerging from
the retail competition subgame.19
When being offered a contract ti = (fi, wi), Ri again expects M to offer and Rj to accept a
tariff Tj (ti) given by:
Tj (ti) = argmax
(wj ,fj)
(wi − c)qR (wi, wj) + fi + (wj − c)qR (wj, wi) + fj
s.t. : fj ≤ πR (wj ,Wi (tj))
Clearly, the solution of this program does not depend on fi and, since the objective function is
strictly increasing in fj , the constraint must be binding. The rival’s anticipated contract is thus
given by:
Wj (wi) = argmax
wj
(wi − c)qR (wi, wj) + (wj − c)qR (wj, wi) + πR (wj,Wi (wj)) (7)
and
Fj (wi) = πR (Wj (wi) ,Wi (Wj (wi))) .
The following proposition provides some characterization of wary beliefs equilibria under
interim observability:20
19Denoting by qC (wi, wj) and pB (wi, wj) the standard Cournot quantities and Bertrand prices for wholesale
prices wi and wj , the quantity sold by Ri is qi = qR (wi, wj) = qC (wi, wj) when retailers compete in a Cournot
fashion and qi = qR (wi, wj) = D
¡
pB (wi, wj) , pB (wj , wi)
¢
when they compete in a Bertrand fashion.
20For a complete analysis of the interim unobservability case, see the Web appendix to this paper, available at
http://www.idei.asso.fr/English/ECv/CvChercheurs/EcvRey.html.
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Proposition 5 When contracts are interim observable, wary beliefs no longer coincide with
passive beliefs. If retailers have wary beliefs, then:
(i) In any symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium retail price is lower than the monopoly
price;
(ii) if demand is linear, there exists a unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs, and this
equilibrium is symmetric.
4.4 Price comparisons
Wary beliefs mitigate somewhat the scope for opportunism. In particular, they eliminate the
equilibrium nonexistence problem when demand is linear. We also checked that, while wary be-
liefs coincide with passive beliefs in the case of Cournot competition and interim unobservability,
in all other cases wary beliefs (symmetric) equilibrium prices are below the monopoly level but
above the level achieved in passive beliefs equilibria (when they exist). The intuition is that
when a retailer is offered a higher wholesale price than expected, with wary beliefs he anticipates
that the other retailer also receives a higher wholesale price,21 and is thus willing to pay a higher
franchise fee than with passive beliefs; this, in turn, encourages the manufactuer to offer higher
wholesale prices, leading to higher retail prices as well.
More precisely, for the unique equilibrium with polynomial beliefs, and for any 0 < β < 1
and 0 ≤ c < 1 (with pi,jP denoting the candidate equilibrium retail price with passive beliefs):
pC,OP < p
B = pB,UP < p
B,O
P < p
C,U
P = p
C = pC,U < pC,O < pB,O < pB,U < pM .
Thus, with wary beliefs prices are lower with retail Cournot competition than with retail
Bertrand competition. This comes from the fact that, while price competition is more intense
than quantity competition for given wholesale prices, the manufacturer’s opportunism is moder-
ated in the Bertrand setting, leading to higher wholesale prices — and sufficiently higher to offset
the lower retail margin. Consider for example the interim unobservability case. When retailers
compete in quantities, wary beliefs then coincide with passive beliefs and lead to the standard
Cournot outcome. In the Bertrand setting, the actual quantities sold by the two retailers are
interdependent: retailers anticipate that their rival will be charged a higher price when they
are themselves charged a higher price, which in turn encourages the manufacturer to maintain
relatively higher prices. A similar argument applies when the contracts are interim observ-
able, although actual quantities are now interdependent in both settings. The gap between the
equilibrium prices under Cournot and Bertrand is reduced, since contract interim observability
makes the outcome more competitive in Bertrand but less competitive in Cournot.
21That is, W 0i > 0 (given the linearity of demand and of retail responses, ∂
2
12πP = ∂1q
R
2 + ∂2q
R
1 > 0).
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5 Application: the anticompetitive impact of Resale PriceMain-
tenance
5.1 Contract equilibrium
OS have shown that, when retailers compete in prices and never observe rivals’ contracts, in
all “contract equilibria” the manufacturer’s opportunism leads retailers to charge the standard
Bertrand price
¡
pB
¢
; OS have also shown that RPM, in the form of a price ceiling, solves the
opportunism problem:
Proposition 6 (O’Brien and Shaffer, RJE 1992) In all contract equilibria, the manufac-
turer charges a marginal price equal to its marginal cost and retailers charge the Bertrand price¡
p∗i = pB
¢
. When Resale Price Maintenance (or a price ceiling) is allowed, there exists a con-
tract equilibrium where the manufacturer maintains monopoly prices
¡
pi = pM
¢
and achieves the
monopoly profit.
As in HT for Cournot downstream competition, the scope for opportunism comes from the
fact that, when negotiating with Ri, M has an incentive to free-ride on Rj’s margin. A solution
to this free-riding problem is to squeeze Rj ’s margin, which can be achieved by imposing a price
ceiling equal to the (marginal) wholesale price: this removes the manufacturer’s incentives to
engage in opportunism and restores the credibility of monopoly prices.
5.2 Wary beliefs
As already discussed, the concept of “contract equilibrium” is intuitive but does not coincide
with the equilibrium of a well-defined game. In addition, the related notion of passive beliefs
equilibrium is subject to nonexistence problems, which potentially limits the relevance of the
analysis. However, using wary beliefs in the above linear model, we can check that the insight
of OS is robust.
We introduce RPM as follows:
1. M makes a take-it-or-leave offer to each retailer; each retailer only observes its own offer
and decides whether to accept it. Each contract now consists of a two-part tariff, together
with an imposed retail price.
2. The retailers who have accepted a contract in the first stage set the retail price imposed
by the manufacturer and sell so as to satisfy demand.
There is thus no actual retail competition; and when receiving an offer (fi, wi; pi), Ri must
anticipate not only the two-part tariff tj offered to its competitor, but also the imposed retail
price pj . We have:
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Proposition 7 In the price competition setting with RPM contracts, when demand is linear
there exists an equilibrium with wary beliefs where prices and the producer’s profit are at the
monopoly level.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition is the same as in OS’s analysis of contract equilibria. The manufacturer’s
opportunism problem arises when retail margins are strictly positive. Then, when M signs a
contract with R1, M is interested by the quantity sold through R2 because of its margin w2− c
but does not take into account R2’ margin p2 −w2. Whenever this retail margin is positive, M
does not entirely internalize the effect of a cut in price p1, which leads to prices lower than the
monopoly level. With RPM , M can however set both the wholesale prices and the retail prices
at the monopoly level, thereby eliminating retailers’ margins and the source of its opportunistic
behavior.
Remark: Cournot competition. RPM may not solve the opportunism problem in a Cournot-
like setting. Consider for example a framework à la Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in which
retailers first-order quantities and then compete in prices:
1. M makes a take-it-or-leave offer to each retailer; each retailer only observes its own offer
and decides whether to accept it. Each contract now consists of a two-part tariff, together
with an imposed retail price.
2. The retailers who have accepted a contract in the first stage order quantities and resell
them on the retail market at the price imposed by the manufacturer.
It is easy to check that in this framework RPM does not have any effect and thus cannot
eliminate opportunism. Once M has convinced Ri to accept a contract ti, the profit it will
make with that retailer is not affected by the contract tj negotiated with Rj, since M does
not care about the quantity eventually sold by Ri, but only about the quantity ordered by Ri,
which itself only depends only on ti. In order to eliminate any scope for opportunism, the profit
achieved with one retailer would need to depend on the contract offered to the rival retailer —
e.g., through buy-back or returns policies.
6 Concluding remarks
The above analysis shows that wary beliefs provide a reasonable alternative to passive or market-
by-market beliefs whenever the contract actually offered to one downstream firm affects the
upstream monopolist’s incentives when dealing with the other downstream firm. Whenever such
interdependence arises: (i) an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist, due to the fact
that multilateral deviations may become attractive; and (ii) passive beliefs differ from and are
arguably less plausible than wary beliefs. We also show that an equilibrium with wary beliefs
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exists in the linear model and that this equilibrium still reflects the “opportunism” problem
generated by contract secrecy.
O’Brien and Shaffer discuss several cases in which RPM has been adopted by an upstream
supplier in order to exert its market power.22 Our analysis shows that, while the contract equilib-
rium concept adopted by O’Brien and Shaffer is debatable, their insight is indeed robust: when
considering equilibria with wary beliefs, RPM allows the manufacturer to solve its commitment
problem and maintain monopoly prices.
Another way to test the robustness of this insight consists in reverting to public contracts,
but assuming that the manufacturer deals with the retailers in sequence, as in the following
three-stage game:
1. M publicly offers R1 a wholesale two-part tariff t1(q) = f1+w1q, which R1 publicly accepts
or refuses.
2. M publicly offers R2 a wholesale two-part tariff t2(q) = f2+w2q, which R2 publicly accepts
or refuses.
3. Retailers who have accepted a contract set their prices and order quantities so as to satisfy
demand.
It can then be checked that the vertically integrated outcome cannot be supported in equi-
librium, for the same reason as before: when negotiating R2’s contract, M has an inventive to
free-ride on R1’s retail margin and generate a lower price p2 < pm2 . RPM again restores monopoly
profits: if contracts include an imposed retail price, the equilibrium involvesw1 = p1 = pm1 , which
induces p2 = pm2 and thus allows the manufacturer to generate and recover the monopoly profit.
Hence RPM restores the vertically integrated outcome that would otherwise be eroded by com-
petition. As in OS, a price ceiling suffices to obtain this result, by removing the manufacturer’s
incentives for opportunism.23
22OS provides two statements along these lines, one by a grocery store owner and one by the president of the
US leading supplier of golf equipment.
23An industry-wide retail price floor (applying to both retailers) would also solve the manufacturer’s commit-
ment problem (see Rey and Tirole (1997)).
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A Price competition and interim unobservability
We study here price competition with interim unobservability, and focus on beliefs Wj (wi)
that depend only on the wholesale price (not on the franchise fee). Ri’s best reply to the Rj’s
anticipated retail price Pj(Wj(wi)), for i 6= j = 1, 2, is then given by:
Pi(wi) = argmax
pi
(pi −wi)D(pi, Pj(Wj(wi))).
The manufacturer chooses the equilibrium wholesale prices, w∗1 and w∗2, so as to maximise
its profit
πP (w1, w2) = (w1 − c)D (P1 (w1) , P2 (w2)) + (P1 (w1)−w1)D (P1 (w1) , P1 (W1 (w1)))
+ (w2 − c)D (P2 (w2) , P1 (w1)) + (P2 (w2)−w2)D (P2 (w2) , P2 (W2 (w2))) ;
where the wary beliefs satisfy ∂1πP (W1 (w) , w) = 0 and ∂2πP (w,W2 (w)) = 0 .
A.1 Any symmetric equilibrium retail price is strictly lower than the monopoly
price
Focusing on symmetric equilibria, the manufacturer’s program can be rewritten as follows:
(w∗, w∗) = argmax
(w1,w2)
πP (w1, w2) ,
where
πP (w1, w2) = πM (P (w1) , P (w2)) + (P (w1)−w1) (D (P (w1) , P (W (w1)))−D (P (w1) , P (w2)))
+ (P (w2)−w2) (D (P (w2) , P (W (w2)))−D (P (w2) , P (w1)))
and
• πM (p1, p2) = (p1 − c)D (p1, p2) + (p2 − c)D (p1, p2) ;
• the retailers’ pricing strategy is
P (w) = argmax
p
(p−w)D (p, P (W (w))) ; (P )
• and the wary beliefs W (w) are such that
∂1πP (W (w) , w) = 0. (W )
A.1.1 The equilibrium retail price is lower than the monopoly price
¡
p∗ ≤ pM
¢
Let us first show that any symmetric equilibrium retail price must be lower than the monopoly
price, characterized by ∂1πM
¡
pM , pM
¢
= 0.
• First-order condition of the manufacturer’s maximization program:
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The first-order condition of the manufacturer’s program is ∂1πP (w∗, w∗) = 0 , that is, with
p∗ = P (w∗) , £
∂1πM (p∗, p∗) + (p∗ −w∗)∂2D (p∗, p∗)
¡
W 0 (w∗)− 1
¢¤
P 0 (w∗) = 0.
• Step 1: P 0 (w∗) 6= 0
The first-order condition of the retailers’ program writes as:
(P (w)−w) ∂1D (P (w) , P (W (w))) +D (P (w) , P (W (w))) = 0. (A1)
Differentiating (A1) at w = w∗ yields:24
(P 0 (w∗)− 1) ∂1D + (p∗ −w∗)
¡
∂211D + ∂212D.W 0 (w∗)
¢
P 0 (w∗)
(∂1D + ∂2D.W 0 (w∗))P 0 (w∗) = 0,
or £
2∂1D + ∂2D.W 0 (w∗) + (p∗ −w∗)
¡
∂211D + ∂212D.W 0 (w∗)
¢¤
P 0 (w∗) = ∂1D. (A2)
∂1D < 0 then implies P 0 (w∗) 6= 0.
• Step 2: p∗ ≤ pM
Since P 0 (w∗) 6= 0, the first-order condition of the manufacturer’s program simplifies to
∂1πM (p∗, p∗) = − (p∗ −w∗) ∂2D (p∗, p∗)
¡
W 0 (w∗)− 1
¢
. (A3)
Differentiating (W ) with respect to w yields:
∂211πP (W (w) , w)W 0 (w) + ∂212πP (W (w) , w) = 0, (A4)
which, evaluated at w = w∗, leads to:
∂211πP (w∗, w∗) .W 0 (w∗) + ∂212πP (w∗, w∗) = 0⇔W 0 (w∗) = −
∂212πP (w∗, w∗)
∂211πP (w∗, w∗)
.
The second-order conditions of the manufacturer’s program thus requires |W 0 (w∗) ≤ 1| .
Evaluating (A1) at w = w∗ yields
− (p∗ −w∗)∂1D (p∗, p∗) = D (p∗, p∗) ,
and thus p∗ > w∗. Finally, since ∂2D (p∗, p∗) > 0:
• either W 0 (w∗) < 1, in which case (A3) implies ∂1πM (p∗, p∗) < 0; the concavity of the
function πM then ensures that p∗ < pM ;
• or W 0 (w∗) = 1, in which case p∗ = pM .
24The derivatives of the demand function D are all evaluated at (p∗, p∗) .
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A.1.2 The monopoly price is not an equilibrium price (⇔W 0 (w∗) 6= 1) .
In order to sustain the monopoly price as an equilibrium price, the equilibrium wholesale price¡
w∗ = wM
¢
must satisfy:
D
¡
pM , pM
¢
+
¡
pM −wM
¢
∂1D
¡
pM , pM
¢
= 0 and W 0
¡
wM
¢
= 1.
The second condition implies that ∂211πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
+ ∂212πP (w∗, w∗) = 0, and we thus need to
look at third-order effects. We now show that the gain from a symmetric deviation
¡
wM + ε, wM + ε
¢
is strictly positive for ε > 0 (small enough), thereby ruling out wM as a possible equilibrium
wholesale price. The gain from such a deviation is:
δ (ε) = πP (wM + ε,wM + ε)− πP (wM , wM).
If wM is a symmetric equilibrium wholesale price, since ∂211πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
+∂212πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
= 0
and δ0 (0) = 0, we also have δ00 (0) = 0. Using the symmetry of the profit function πP , the third-
order derivative is given by:
δ000 (0) = 2∂3111πP (wM , wM) + 6∂3112πP (wM , wM). (A5)
Differentiating (A4) with respect to w at w = wM yields, usingW 0
¡
wM
¢
= 1 and the symmetry
of the profit function πP :
∂3111πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
+ 3∂3112πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
+ ∂211πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
W 00
¡
wM
¢
= 0. (A6)
Using (A6) , we can rewrite (A5) as:
δ000 (0) = −2∂211πP
¡
wM , wM
¢
W 00
¡
wM
¢
.
We thus need to show that W 00
¡
wM
¢
> 0.
The beliefs W (w) are such that ∂1πP (W1 (w) , w) = 0, that is:
P 0 (W (w))
£
∂1πM (P (W (w)) , P (w)) + (P (w)−w)∂1D (P (w) , P (W (w)))
+ (P (W (w))−W (w)) (∂1D (P (W (w)) , P (W (W (w)))− ∂1D (P (W (w)) , P (w)))]
+ (P 0 (W (w))− 1) [D (P (W (w)) , P (w))−D (P (W (w)) , P (W (W (w)))]
+P 0 (W (W (w)))W 0 (W (w)) (P (W (w))−w)∂2D (P (W (w)) , P (W (W (w))) = 0.
Differentiating this equation with respect to w at w = wM (using ∂1πM
¡
pM , pM
¢
= 0 and
W 0
¡
wM
¢
= 1) leads to:
W 00
¡
wM
¢ ¡
pM −wM
¢
∂2D
¡
pM , pM
¢
= −P 0
¡
wM
¢ ¡
∂211πM
¡
wM , wM
¢
+ ∂212πM
¡
wM , wM
¢¢
.
Thus W 00
¡
wM
¢
has the same sign as P 0
¡
wM
¢
. Evaluating (A2) at w = wM leads to:25
P 0
¡
wM
¢ ¡
2∂1D + ∂2D +
¡
pM −wM
¢ ¡
∂211D + ∂212D
¢¢
= ∂1D.
25The derivatives of the demand function being evaluated at
¡
pM , pM
¢
.
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The strict concavity of the profit function
¡
p1 −wM
¢
D (p1, p2) +
¡
p2 −wM
¢
D (p2, p1) ensures
that
∂1D + ∂2D +
¡
pM −wM
¢ ¡
∂211D + ∂212D
¢
< 0,
which in turns establishes P 0
¡
wM
¢
> 0 and concludes the proof.
A.2 Existence (and uniqueness) with polynomial beliefs
We now restrict attention to the linear demand case:
D (pi, pj) =
1− β − pi + βpj
1− β2
.
For each retailer’s maximization program, the first-order condition is then necessary and suffi-
cient and writes as:
2Pi(wi)− βPj(Wj(wi)) = 1− β +wi. (Pi)
Using (Pi) we thus have:
D(Pi(wi), Pj(Wj(wi))) =
Pi(wi)−wi
1− β2
.
Ri’s beliefs are such that ∂2πP (wi,Wj (wi)) = 0, that is:
((1− β)c+ βwi −Wj (wi))P 0j (Wj (wi)) + 1− β − Pj (Wj (wi)) + βPi (wi)
+2
³
P 0j (Wj (wi))− 1
´
(Pj (Wj (wi))−Wj (wi)) = 0.
(Wj)
Let us now consider the polynomial solutions to the system consisting of equations ((Wi), (Pi))i=1,2
We denote by ni and mi the degrees of the polynomials Wi (wj) and Pi (wi), and by ωi,k and
pi,k the coefficients of their terms of degree k:
Wi(w) =
niX
k=0
ωi,kwk and Pi(w) =
miX
k=0
πi,kwk.
• Step 1: any polynomial solution is affine (0 ≤ m1,m2, n1, n2 ≤ 1)
Consider (Pi):
2Pi(wi)| {z }
deg=mi
− βPj(Wj(wi))| {z }
deg=mjnj
= 1− β +wi| {z }
deg=1
.
Three cases can arise:
1. mi < mjnj . This implies mi = 0 and mj = nj = 1. Then (Wi) reduces to
1− β − πi,0 + βPj (wj)− 2(πi,0 −Wi(wj)) = 0,
and thus ni = 1.
2. mi > mjnj . This implies mi = 1 and mjnj = 0. Thus, either mj = 0 or mj > 0 and
nj = 0.
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(a) The case mj = 0 is similar to case 1 (reverting the roles of i and j).
(b) If mj > 0 then nj = 0 and (Pj) reduces to:
2Pj(w) = βPi(Wi(w)) + 1− β +w
= β (πi,0 + πi,1Wi(w)) + 1− β +w.
and therefore mj = max (ni, 1) . If ni ≤ 1, then no degree exceeds 1. The only
remaining case is mj = nj ≥ 2. Since mi = 1 and nj = 0, equation (Pi) leads to
Pi(w) =
1
2
(1− β + βPj(ωj,0) +w)⇒ P 0i (w) =
1
2
.
Differentiating (Wi) and (Pj) twice then yields respectively
βP 00j (w) =
1
2
W 00i (w) and βW 00i (w) = 4P 00j (w),
implying 2β2P 00j (w) =W 00i (w) = 4P 00j (w) ( 6= 0 since ni = mj ≥ 2), a contradiction.
3. mi = mjnj ≥ 1. In this case, either mj = mini ≥ 1 or all degrees are equal or lower than
1 (simply inverting the roles played by i and j in cases 1 and 2).
But mi = mjnj ≥ 1 and mj = mini ≥ 1 imply ni = nj = 1 and mj = mi = m ≥ 1. The only
interesting case is when m ≥ 2. Then (Wj) yields:
((1− β)c+ βwi −Wj (wi))P 0j (Wj (wi)) + 1− β − Pj (Wj (wi)) + βPi (wi)| {z }
deg≤m
+2
¡
P 0j (Wj (wi))− 1
¢
(Pj (Wj (wi))−Wj (wi))| {z }
deg=2m−1≥3
= 0,
which contradicts m > 1.
This concludes the proof and shows that polynomial solutions must be affine.
• Step 2: any equilibrium with affine wary beliefs satisfies π1,1 = π2,1 and ω1,1 = ω2,1 .
With affine beliefs, (Pi) reduces to
2 (πi,0 + πi,1w)− β (πj,0 + πj,1 (ωj,0 + ωj,1w)) = 1− β +w,
and since it holds for any w, it implies
2πi,0 − βπj,0 = 1− β + βπj,1ωj,0, (A7)
2πi,1 − βπj,1ωj,1 = 1. (A8)
(A8i) and (A8j) yield
πi,1 =
2+ βωj,1
4− β2ω1,1ω2,1
,
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and thus: ¡
4− β2ω1,1ω2,1
¢
(πi,1 − πj,1) = β (ωj,1 − ωi,1) . (A9)
Similarly, (Wj) implies:
2
¡
π2j,1 − 3πj,1 + 1
¢
ωj,0 = −1 + β − (1− β)cπj,1 + (3− 2πj,1)πj,0 − βπi,0, (A10)
2
¡
π2j,1 − 3πj,1 + 1
¢
ωj,1 = −β (πi,1 + πj,1) . (A11)
Using (A8) to replace πj,1ωj,1 in (A11) yields:
6 + β2 (πi,1 + πj,1) + 4πi,1πj,1 + 2βωj,1 = 12πi,1 − 2πj,1. (A12)
Substracting (A12j) to (A12i), we have:
5(πi,1 − πj,1) = β (ωj,1 − ωi,1) , (A13)
which, combined with (A9), imposes:¡
1 + β2ω1,1ω2,1
¢
(πi,1 − πj,1) = 0. (A14)
But the second-order conditions of the manufacturer’s program impose 0 ≤ ω1,1ω2,1 ≤ 1.26
Therefore, (A14) imposes π1,1 = π2,1 = π1 and thus ω1,1 = ω2,1 = ω1.
Given the symmetry, (A8) and (A11) simplify to
βω1π1 = 2π1 − 1, (A15)¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
ω1 = −βπ1. (A16)
• Step 3: there exists a unique pair (π∗1, ω∗1) satisfying (8) and (8) as well as
second-order conditions.
Let us use (A15) to eliminate ω1 in (A16):¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
(2π1 − 1) = −β2π21 (A17)
⇔ 2π31 −
¡
7− β2
¢
π21 + 5π1 − 1 = 0. (A18)
The left-hand side is a polynomial ϕ of degree 3 such that:
ϕ(0) = −1 < 0 < ϕ
µ
1
2
¶
=
β2
4
and ϕ(1) = −(1− β2) < 0 < ϕ (+∞) .
Therefore, ϕ has three roots: one in
¤
0, 12
£
, one in
¤
1
2 , 1
£
and one in ]1,+∞[.
26Beliefs satisfy ∂1πP (W1(w), w) = 0 and ∂2πP (w,W2(w)) = 0. Therefore, ωi,1 = −∂212πP /∂2iiπP and the
second-order conditions of the manufacturer’s program impose ω1,1ω2,1 =
¡
∂212π
P ¢2 /∂211πP∂222πP > 0.
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Using the retailers’s responses, the manufacturer’s profit can be expressed as
πP (w1, w2) =
·
(w1 − c)D(P1(w1), P2(w2)) +
(P1(w1)−w1)2
1− β2
+(w2 − c)D(P2(w2), P1(w1)) +
(P2(w2)−w2)2
1− β2
¸
.
(A19)
Therefore:
∂1πP (w1, w2) =
π1
1− β2
(−(w1 − c) + β(w2 − c)) +D(P1(w1), P2(w2))
+
2
1− β2
(π1 − 1)(P1(w1)−w1),
and
∂211πP =
2
1− β2
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
,
∂212πP =
2
1− β2
βπ1.
A first necessary condition is ∂211πP ≤ 0, that is π21−3π1+1 ≤ 0. Together with (A17), it implies
2π1 − 1 > 0⇔ π1 >
1
2
. (A20)
A second necessary condition is
¡
∂211πP
¢2 ≥ ¡∂212πP ¢2, which is equivalent to¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢2 − β2π21 ≥ 0
⇔ −
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
(2π1 − 1)− β2π21| {z }
=0 from (A17)
− π1 (1− π1)
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
≥ 0
⇔ π1 (1− π1) ≥ 0⇔ 0 ≤ π1 ≤ 1. (A21)
Together, (A20) and (A21) impose that the solution of (A18) is the unique root of ϕ in
¤
1
2 , 1
£
.
(A15) then uniquely defines ω∗1:
ω∗1 =
2π∗1 − 1
βπ∗1
> 0.
• Step 4: the solution of the overall program, if it exists, is symmetric.
Substracting (A7j) from (A7i) and (A10j) from (A10i) yields respectively:
(2 + β) (π1,0 − π2,0) = βπ1 (ω1,0 − ω2,0) ,
2
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
(ω1,0 − ω2,0) = (3 + β − 2π1) (π1,0 − π2,0) ,
thus implying
2 (2 + β)
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
(π1,0 − π2,0) = βπ1(3− β − 2π1) (π1,0 − π2,0) .
But then π21 − 3π1 + 1 < 0 and 12 < π1 < 1 imply π1,0 = π2,0 and thus ω1,0 = ω2,0.
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• Step 5: there exists a unique solution.
Given the symmetry, (A7) and (A10) reduce to:
(2− β)π0 − βπ1ω0 = 1− β, (A21)
(3− β − 2π1)π0 − 2
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
ω0 = 1− β + (1− β)cπ1. (A22)
The determinant is
−2(2− β)
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
+ βπ1(3− β − 2π1) > 0.
It is positive since
¡
π21 − 3π1 + 1
¢
< 0 and 12 < π1 < 1. Therefore, (A21) and (A22) uniquely
define π∗0 and ω∗0 as functions of π1. The equilibrium retail price is then
p∗ = 1− β +w
∗
2− β ,
where
w∗ =W (w∗) = ω∗0 (π∗1) + ω∗1 (π∗1)w∗ =
ω∗0 (π∗1)
1− ω∗1 (π∗1)
.
B Resale Price Maintenance: proof of Proposition 7
We show here that with RPM there exists a symmetric equilibrium, with affine wary beliefs
based on offered prices, that sustains the monopoly price pM . Note that with RPM, interim
observability does not matter, since retail prices are contractually set ex ante.
Receiving an offer (fi, wi; pi), Ri anticipates that Rj has accepted the contract (W (wi, pi) ,
F (wi, pi) ;P (wi, pi)) and accepts the offer if and only if
fi ≤ (pi −wi)Di(pi, P (wi, pi)).
The beliefs W, F and P must therefore satisfy
F (w, p) = (P (w, p)−W (w, p))D(P (w, p) , P (W (w, p), P (w, p))),
and
(W (w, p), P (w, p)) = argmax
(w2,p2)
[(w − c)D(p, p2) + (w2 − c)D(p2, p) + (p2 −w2)D(p2, P (w2, p2))] .
The first-order conditions are:
β (p− P (W,P )) + (P (w, p)−W (w, p))∂P
∂w
(W,P ) = 0,
(1− β) (1− c) + βw − 2P (w, p) + βP (W,P )− β (P (w, p)−W (w, p)) ∂P
∂p
(W,P ) = 0.
In equilibrium, we must also have
P (w∗, p∗) = p∗ and W (w∗, p∗) = w∗. (B1)
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• Affine beliefs leading to the monopoly price
We consider beliefs of the form
P (w, p) = αP + ωPw+ πP p,
W (w, p) = αW + ωWw + πWp,
and look for an equilibrium where w∗ = p∗ = pM = 1+c2 . (B1) imposes
αP = (1− πP − ωP ) pM =
(1− πP − ωP ) (1 + c)
2
, (B2)
αW = (1− πW − ωW ) pM =
(1− πW − ωW ) (1 + c)
2
. (B3)
Then, the first-order conditions lead to:
1− π2P + ω2P − 2ωP (πW + ωW ) = 0, (B4)
ωP (ωP − πP − 2ωW ) = 0, (B5)
1− π2P + ωP (πP − 2πW ) = 0, (B6)
β (πP − ωP ) (πW + ωW )− β − 2 (πP + ωP ) (1− βπP ) = 0, (B7)
β (πP − ωP )ωW − β + 2ωP (1− βπP ) = 0, (B8)
β (πP − ωP )πW + 2πP (1− βπP ) = 0. (B9)
It is easy to check that (B4) = (B5)+ (B6) and (B7) = (B8)+ (B9). Equations (B8) and (B9)
lead to:
ωW =
β − 2ωP (1− βπP )
β (πP − ωP )
and πW =
2πP (1− βπP )
β (πP − ωP )
. (B10)
Assuming that ωP 6= 0, subtracting (B6) from πPωP (B5) yields
3πP − ωP
πP − ωP
= 0⇔ ωP = 3πP . (B11)
Then, rewriting (B6) using (B10) and (B11), it comes:
8βπ2P − 6πP + β = 0⇔ πP =
3±
p
9− 8β2
8β
.
• Second-order conditions
We now show that one of the two above solutions satisfies the second-order conditions of the
overall program. The manufacturer’s maximization program is:
(w∗1, p∗1, w∗2, p∗2) = argmax
(w1,p1,w2,p2)
[(w1 − c)D(p1, p2) + (p1 −w1)D(p1, P (w1, p1))
+(w2 − c)D(p2, p1) + (p2 −w2)D(P (w2, p2), p2)] .
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Using the linear form of function P , the Hessian matrix only depends on πP and ωP and is equal
to
H(ωP,πP ) =


−2βπP β (ωP − πP ) 0 β
β (ωP − πP ) −2(1− βπP ) β 0
0 β −2βπP β (ωP − πP )
β 0 β (ωP − πP ) −2(1− βπP )


.
Using (B11) the matrix can be simplified into:
H(πP ) =


−2βπP 2βπP 0 β
2βπP −2(1− βπP ) β 0
0 β −2βπP 2βπP
β 0 2βπP −2(1− βπP )


.
The four eigenvalues of the matrix H (πP ) are given by:
λ (πP ) = −1− 2βπP ±
q
1− 8βπP + β2
¡
1± 4πP + 20π2P
¢
.
It can then be checked that the matrix H
µ
3−
√
9−8β2
8β
¶
is definite negative (the four eigenvalues
are strictly negative). This ensures that there exists a symmetric equilibrium with affine wary
beliefs leading to the monopoly prices and profit.
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